1 Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics?

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Ordinary Men

On July 13, 1942, the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101, stationed in Poland, were wakened at the crack of dawn and driven to the outskirts of a small Polish village. Armed with additional ammunition, but with no idea what to expect, the 500 men gathered around their well-liked commander, Major Wilhelm Trapp (Browning, 1993). Nervously, Trapp explained that he and his men had been assigned a frightfully unpleasant task, not to his liking, but the orders came from the highest authorities. There were some 1,800 Jews in the village, who were said to be involved with the partisans. The order was to take the male Jews of working age to a work camp. The women, children, and elderly were to be shot on the spot. As he spoke, Trapp had tears in his eyes and visibly fought to control himself. He and his men had never before been confronted with such a task. Concluding his speech, Trapp made an extraordinary offer: If any of the older men did not feel up to the task that lay before them, they could step out.

Trapp paused for a moment. The men had a few seconds to decide. A dozen men stepped forward. The others went on to participate in the massacre. Many of them, however, after they had done their duty once, vomited or had other visceral reactions that made it impossible to continue killing and were then assigned to other tasks. Almost all were horrified and disgusted by what they were doing. Yet why did only a mere dozen men out of 500 declare themselves unwilling to participate in the mass murder?

One might first think of anti-Semitism. That, however, is unlikely, as the historian Christopher Browning (1993) documents in his seminal book Ordinary Men. Most of the battalion members were middle-aged family men, considered too old to be drafted into the German army, and drafted instead into the police battalion. By virtue of their age, their formative
years had taken place in the pre-Nazi era, and they knew different political standards and moral norms. They came from the city of Hamburg, by reputation one of the least nazified cities in Germany, and from a social class that had been anti-Nazi in its political culture. These men would not have seemed to be a promising group of mass murderers on behalf of the Nazi vision.

The extensive interviews with the men indicate that the primary reason was not conformity with authority either. Unlike in the Milgram experiment, where an authoritative researcher told students to apply electric shocks to other people, Major Trapp explicitly allowed for “disobedience.” The men who stepped out experienced no sanctions from him. If neither anti-Semitism nor fear of authority was the explanation, what else had turned ordinary men into mass killers? The documents collected on this case reveal a different reason. Most policemen’s behavior seemed to follow a social heuristic:

Don’t break ranks.

The men felt “the strong urge not to separate themselves from the group by stepping out” (Browning, 1993, p. 71), even if this conformity meant violating the moral imperative “Don’t kill innocent people.” For most, it was easier to shoot rather than to break ranks. Browning ends his book with a disturbing question: “Within virtually every social collective, the peer group exerts tremendous pressures on behavior and sets moral norms. If the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot?” From a moral point of view, nothing can justify this behavior. In trying to understand why certain situations can promote or inhibit morally significant actions, however, we can find an explanation in social heuristics.1

Organ Donors

Since 1995, some 50,000 people in the United States have died waiting for a suitable organ donor (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). Although most Americans say they approve of organ donation, relatively few sign a donor card. Here neither peer pressure, nor obedience, nor fear of being punished seems to be at issue. Why are only 28% of Americans but a striking 99.9% of French citizens donors? Do Americans fear that if emergency room doctors know that the patients are potential organ donors, they won’t work as hard to save them? Or are Americans more anxious about a postmortem opening of their bodies than the French? Yet why are only 17% of British citizens but 99.9% of Hungarians donors?
If moral behavior is the result of deliberate moral reasoning, then the problem might be that Americans and the British are not aware of the need for organs. This view calls for an information campaign to raise people’s awareness so that they change their behavior. Dozens of such campaigns have been launched in the United States and the United Kingdom with limited success. If moral behavior is the result of stable preferences, as postulated by rational choice theory, then Americans and the British might simply find too little utility in donation. Yet that does not seem to be the case either. Something stronger than preferences and deliberate reasoning appears to guide behavior. The differences between nations seem to be produced by a simple rule, the default rule:

If there is a default, do nothing about it.

In explicit-consent countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the law is that nobody is a donor without registering to be one. You need to opt in. In presumed-consent countries such as France and Hungary, everyone is a donor unless they opt out. The majority of citizens in these and other countries seem to follow the same default rule, and the striking differences between nations result as a consequence. However, not everyone follows the default rule. Among those who do not, most opt in but few opt out. The 28% of Americans who opted in and the 0.1% of French citizens who opted out illustrate this asymmetry. The perceived rationale behind the rule could be that the existing law is interpreted as a reasonable recommendation; otherwise it would not have been chosen by the policymakers. From a rational choice perspective, however, the default should have little effect because people will override the default if it is not consistent with their preference. After all, one only needs to sign a form to opt in or to opt out. However, the empirical evidence demonstrates that it is the default rule rather than alleged preferences that explains most people’s behavior.

Fast and Frugal Heuristics

The two examples illustrate the general thesis of this essay: Morally significant actions (moral actions, for short) can be influenced by simple heuristics. The resulting actions can be morally repulsive, as in the case of mass killing, or positive, as when people donate organs or risk their lives to save that of another person. The underlying heuristic, however, is not good or bad per se.

The study of heuristics will never replace the need for moral deliberation and individual responsibility, but it can help us to understand which
environments influence moral behavior and how to possibly modify them to the better. One and the same heuristic can produce actions we might applaud and actions we condemn, depending on where and when a person relies on it. For instance, the don’t-break-ranks heuristic can turn a soldier simultaneously into a loyal comrade and into a killer. As an American rifleman recalls about comradeship during World War II: “The reason you storm the beaches is not patriotism or bravery. It’s that sense of not wanting to fail your buddies. There’s sort of a special sense of kinship” (Terkel, 1997, p. 164). Similarly, the default rule can turn a person into an organ donor or none. What appears as inconsistent behavior—how can such a nice guy act so badly, and how can that nasty person be so nice?—can result from the same underlying heuristic.

In this essay, I will look at moral actions through the lens of the theory of fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). This theory is based on the work on bounded rationality by Nobel laureates Herbert Simon and Reinhard Selten. A heuristic is called “fast” if it can make a decision within little time, and “frugal” if it searches for only little information. The science of heuristics centers on three questions:

1. **Adaptive toolbox** What heuristics do people have at their disposal? What are their building blocks, and which evolved (or learned) abilities do these exploit?

2. **Ecological rationality** What environmental structures can a given heuristic exploit, that is, where is it successful and where will it fail? A heuristic is not good or bad, rational or irrational, per se, but only relative to environmental structures.

3. **Design of heuristics and environments** How can heuristics be designed to solve a given problem? How can environments be designed to support the mind in solving a problem?

The first question is descriptive, concerning the content of *Homo sapiens’* adaptive toolbox. The tools in the toolbox are the heuristics, and the term “adaptive” refers to the well-documented fact that people tend to adjust the heuristics they use to the environment or problem they encounter. The second question is normative. The rationality of a heuristic is not logical, but ecological—it is conditional on environmental structure. The study of ecological rationality has produced results that appear logically impossible or counterintuitive, such as when a judgment based on only one reason is as good as or better than one based on more reasons or when partial ignorance leads to more accurate inferences about the
world than more knowledge does (Gigerenzer, 2004). For instance, environmental structures such as high predictive uncertainty, small samples, and skewed cue validities allow the simple “take the best” heuristic, which ignores most information, to make more accurate predictions than do multiple regression or neural networks that integrate all information and use sophisticated calculation (Brighton, 2006; Chater, Oaksford, Nakisa, & Redington, 2003; Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002). Less can be more. The third question concerns cognitive (environmental) engineering. It draws on the results of the study of ecological rationality to design heuristics for given problems, such as whether or not a child should be given antibiotics (Fischer et al., 2002), or to design environments so that they fit the human mind, such as determining how to represent DNA evidence in court so that judges and jurors understand it (Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000).

Heuristics are embedded in (social) environments. For the reserve policemen, the environment included Major Trapp and the other men; the organ donors’ environment is shaped by the legal default. Their actions are explained by both heuristics and their respective environments. This type of explanation goes beyond accounts of moral action in terms of personality traits such as an authoritarian personality, attitudes such as anti-Semitism, or prejudices against minorities or majorities. Unlike traits, attitudes, and preferences, which are assumed to be fairly stable across situations, heuristics tend to be highly context sensitive (Payne et al., 1993). A single policeman isolated from his comrades might not have hesitated to step forward.

If moral action is based on fast and frugal heuristics, it may conflict with traditional standards of morality and justice. Heuristics seem to have little in common with consequentialist views that assume that people (should) make an exhaustive analysis of the consequences of each action, nor with the striving for purity of heart that Kant considered to be an absolute obligation of humans. And they do not easily fit a neo-Aristotelian theory of virtue or Kohlberg’s sophisticated postconventional moral reasoning. The closest cousin within moral philosophy seems to be rule utilitarianism (rather than act utilitarianism), which views a particular action as being right if it is consistent with some moral rule, such as "keep promises" (Downie, 1991). As mentioned before, heuristics provide explanations of actual behavior; they are not normative ideals. Their existence, however, poses normative questions.

What can be gained from analyzing moral actions in terms of fast and frugal heuristics? I believe that there are two goals:
1. *Explanation of moral actions* The first result would be a theory that explains the heuristic processes underlying moral actions, just as for judgment and decision making in general. Such a theory is descriptive, not normative.

2. *Modification of moral actions* The adaptive nature of heuristics implies that moral actions can be changed from outside, not just from inside the mind. Changes in environments, such as institutions and representations, can be sufficient to foster desired behavior and reduce moral disaster.

To illustrate the second goal, consider again the case of organ donation. A legal system aware of the fact that heuristics rather than reasoned preferences tend to guide behavior can make the desired option the default. In the United States, simply switching the default would save the lives of many patients who otherwise wait in vain for a donor. At the same time, this measure would save the expenses of current and future donor campaigns, which are grounded on an inadequate theory of mind. Setting proper defaults provides a simple solution for what looks like a complex moral problem. Similarly, consider once again the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101. With his offer, Major Trapp brought the Judaeo-Christian commandment “Don’t murder,” with which the Hamburg men grew up, into conflict with the “Don’t break ranks” heuristic. With knowledge of the heuristic guiding his men’s behavior, Major Trapp could have made a difference. He could have framed his offer the other way around, so that not breaking ranks no longer conflicted with not killing. Had he asked those who felt up to the task to step out, the number of men who participated in the killing might have been considerably smaller. This cannot be proven; yet, like Browning, I suspect that situational factors can shape moral behavior, as the prison experiments by Philip Zimbardo and the obedience experiments by Stanley Milgram indicate. These cases exemplify how a theory of heuristics could lead to instructions on how to influence moral action “from outside.”

What are the limits of the heuristics approach? I do not believe that my analysis promises a normative theory of moral behavior. Yet the present descriptive analysis can put constraints on normative theories. A normative theory that is uninformed as to the workings of the mind, or is impossible to implement in a mind (or machine), will most likely not be useful for making our world better (see below).

**Embodiment and Situatedness**

Heuristics allow us to act fast—a requirement in situations where deferring decisions until more information is available can do harm to a
person, such as in emergency unit decisions. Heuristics are frugal, that is, they ignore part of the information, even when it is available. Finally, heuristics can perform well because they are embodied and situated. Let me illustrate these features by an example that has nothing to do with moral action.

How does a player catch a fly ball? If you follow a classical information-processing approach in cognitive science, you assume that the player needs a more or less complete representation of the environment and a sophisticated computer to calculate the trajectory from this representation. To obtain a complete representation, the player would have to estimate the ball’s initial velocity, angle, and distance, taking account of air resistance, wind speed, direction of wind, and spin. The player would then calculate the trajectory and run to the point where the ball will hit the ground. All this creates a nice optimization model, but there is no empirical evidence for it. No mind or machine can solve the problem this way. In the real world, players do not compute trajectories; instead, they rely on a number of simple heuristics. One is the gaze heuristic, which works if the ball is already high up in the air:

Fixate your gaze on the ball, start running, and adjust your speed so that the angle of gaze remains constant.

The gaze heuristic ignores all causal information necessary to compute the trajectory. It does not need a complete representation, even if it could be obtained. The heuristic uses only one piece of information, the angle of gaze. Yet it leads the player to the point where the ball will land. If you ask players how they catch a ball, most do not know the heuristic or can describe only one building block, such as “I keep my eye on the ball.” The heuristic is composed of building blocks that draw on specific abilities. “Fixate your gaze on the ball” is one building block of the heuristic, which exploits the evolved ability to track a moving object against a noisy background. In general, a fast and frugal heuristic is a rule that is anchored in both mind and environment:

1. Embodiment Heuristics exploit evolved abilities, such as the human ability for group identification, imitation, or cheating detection (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2004). The gaze heuristic exploits the ability of object tracking, that is, the ability to track a moving target against a noisy background, which emerges in three-month-old infants (Rosander & Hofsten, 2002). The default heuristic exploits a set of evolved abilities that deal with cooperation in small groups of people, such as imitation and trust.
2. Situatedness  Heuristics exploit environmental structures, such as social institutions or the redundancy of information. The gaze heuristic even manipulates the environment, that is, it transforms the complex relation between player and ball into a simple, linear one.

Evolved abilities allow heuristics to be simple. Today’s robots cannot trace moving objects against noisy backgrounds as well as humans; thus, the gaze heuristic is only simple for the evolved brains of humans, fish, flies, and other animals using it for predation and pursuit. The embodiment of heuristics poses a problem for the view that mental software is largely independent of the hardware and that mental processes can be realized in quite different physical systems. For instance, Hilary Putnam (1960) used Alan Turing’s work as a starting point to argue for a distinction between the mind and the brain in terms of the separation of software from hardware. For many psychologists, this seemed a good basis for the autonomy of psychology in relation to neurophysiology. The rhetoric was that of cognitive systems that describe the thought processes “of everything from man to mouse to microchip” (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986, p. 2). In contrast, heuristics do not function independently of the brain; they exploit it. Therefore, the heuristics used by “man and microchip” should not be the same. In summary, heuristics are simple because they exploit human brains—including their evolved abilities. This position is inconsistent with the materialistic ideal of reducing the mind to the brain, and also with the dualistic ideal of analyzing the mind independent of the brain, and vice versa.

Environmental structures allow heuristics to function well. When a clear criterion of success exists, one can mathematically analyze in which environments a given heuristic will succeed or fail. For instance, the gaze heuristic only works well when the ball is already high up in the air, not beforehand. In the latter case, the third building block of the heuristic needs to be changed into “adjust your speed so that the image of the ball is rising at a constant speed” (Shaffer, Krauchunas, Eddy, & McBeath, 2004). This illustrates that one does not need to develop a new heuristic from scratch for every new situation but can perhaps just modify one building block. The analysis of the situations in which a given heuristic works and fails is called the study of its “ecological rationality.” The study of ecological rationality is difficult to generalize to moral action, unless criteria for success are supplied. Such criteria need to be precise; vague notions such as happiness and pleasure are insufficient for a mathematical analysis of ecological rationality.
Moral Action and Heuristics

I propose three hypotheses. First, moral intuitions as described in the social intuitionist theory (e.g., Haidt, 2001) can be explicated in terms of fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2007). Let me elaborate with a frequently posed distinction: Is moral judgment based on reasons or feelings? According to the philosophical theory of intuitionism, “a person who can grasp the truth of true ethical generalizations does not accept them as the result of a process of ratiocination; he just sees without argument that they are and must be true, and true of all possible worlds” (Harrison, 1967, p. 72). This view makes strong assumptions (that ethical generalizations are synthetic and a priori) and is hard to refute, as Harrison describes in detail. However, the idea that moral judgments are caused by perception-like, self-evident moral intuitions (not necessarily moral truths) has become the fundament of the social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. In this view, “moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached” (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). Just like its philosophical sibling, social intuitionist theory makes a descriptive claim, and the evidence presented includes the sudden appearance in consciousness of moral judgments, after which people are “morally dumbfounded,” that is, they mostly cannot tell how they reached a judgment (Haidt, Algoe, Meijer, Tam, & Chandler, 2000; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). The unresolved issue in this theory is that “moral intuition” remains an unexplained primitive term.²

I agree with the proposition that in many cases moral judgments and actions are due to intuitive rather than deliberative reasoning. I also grant that there are important exceptions to this hypothesis, such as Benjamin Franklin’s (1772/1987) “moral algebra” and the professional reasoning of judges. However, reasons given in public can be post hoc justification. What intuitionist theories could gain from the science of heuristics is to explicate intuition in terms of fast and frugal heuristics. This would provide an understanding of how intuitions are formed.

Here is my second hypothesis: Heuristics that underlie moral actions are largely the same as those for underlying behavior that is not morally tinged. They are constructed from the same building blocks in the adaptive toolbox. That is, one and the same heuristic can solve both problems that we call moral and those we do not. For instance, the “do what the majority do” heuristic (Laland, 2001) guides behavior in a wide range of situations, only some of which concern moral issues:
If you see the majority of your peers behave in a certain way, engage in the same action.

This heuristic produces social facilitation and guides behavior through all states of development from childhood to teenage and adult life. It virtually guarantees social acceptance in one's peer group. It can steer consumer behavior (what clothes to wear, what CDs to buy) and moral action as well (to donate to a charity, to discriminate against minorities). Teenagers tend to buy Nike shoes because their peers do, and skinheads hate foreigners for no other reason than that their peers hate them as well. The second hypothesis implies that moral intuitions are based on reasons, just as in cognitive heuristics, thus questioning the original distinction made between feelings and reasons. By explicating the processes underlying “feeling” or “intuition,” the feeling/reason distinction is replaced by one between the conscious versus unconscious reasons that cause moral judgments.

The third hypothesis is that the heuristics underlying moral action are generally unconscious. If one interviews people, the far majority are unaware of their underlying motives. Rather, they often stutter, laugh, and express surprise at their inability to find supporting reasons for their likes and dislikes, or they invent post hoc justifications (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Tetlock, 2003). This lack of awareness is similar to decision making outside the moral domain. As mentioned before, baseball players are often unaware of the heuristics they use, and consumers are not always able to explain why they bought a particular car, dress, or CD. Because of their simplicity and transparency, however, heuristics can be easily made conscious, and people can learn to use or to avoid them.

The view that moral action is based on fast and frugal heuristics also has three methodological implications:

1. **Study social groups in addition to isolated individuals**  Heuristics exploit evolved abilities and social motives, such as the human potential for imitation, social learning, and feelings of guilt (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). The methodological implication is to study behavior in situations where these heuristics can unfold, such as in the presence of peers (e.g., Asch's [1956] conformity experiments). Compare the situation that the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 faced with the hypothetical moral dilemmas in which an individual has to choose either to kill one person or otherwise let twenty people be killed by someone else (e.g., Williams, 1988). Here, the
experimental participant is studied in isolation. Heuristics such as "don't break ranks" and "do what the majority do" can hardly be detected.

2. **Study natural environments in addition to hypothetical problems**  The science of heuristics aims for theoretical statements that involve the pairing of heuristics with environments, where the environment may select a heuristic or the heuristic may shape the environment (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). The methodological implication is to study moral intuitions in natural environments, or in experimental models thereof (e.g., Zimbardo's prison experiments and Milgram's obedience studies) rather than using hypothetical problems only. Toy problems such as the "trolley problems" eliminate characteristic features of natural environments, such as uncertainty about the full set of possible actions and their consequences, and do not allow the search for more information and alternative courses of action. I am not suggesting that hypothetical moral problems are of no use but that the present focus on hypothetical problems in experimental moral psychology as well as in moral philosophy creates a limited opportunity for understanding moral action. Because heuristics used tend to be very sensitive to social context, the careful analysis of natural environments is essential. This focus on the environment contrasts with those cognitive theories that assume, implicitly or explicitly, that morality is located within the individual mind, like a trait or a set of knowledge structures. For instance, in Kohlberg's (1971) rational cognitive theory, inspired by Piaget's (1932/1965) step model, moral development is a process that can be fully described internally, from egoistic to conventional to postconventional forms of reasoning. In these internalistic views, the structure of the environment appears of little relevance.

3. **Analyze moral behavior in addition to self-reports**  People are typically unaware of the heuristics underlying their moral judgments or understand only part of them. The methodological implication is that asking people for reasons will rarely reveal the heuristics on which they actually base their decisions. Observation and analysis of behavior are indispensable if one wants to understand what drives people.

I will illustrate these points with judgments of trustworthiness in the legal context. The results of the following case study indicate that (1) legal decision makers use fast and frugal heuristics, (2) their heuristics have the same structure (not content) as heuristics used to solve nonmoral problems, (3) magistrates are largely unaware of this fact and believe their decisions are based on elaborate reasoning, and (4) the heuristics appear to be shaped by the social institution in which the decision makers operate.
Bail Decisions and Due Process

One of the initial decisions of the legal system is whether to bail the defendant unconditionally or to make a punitive decision such as custody or imprisonment. The bail decision is not concerned with the defendant's guilt but with his or her moral trustworthiness: whether or not the defendant will turn up at the court hearing, try to silence witnesses, or commit another crime. In the English system, magistrates are responsible for making this decision. About 99.9% of English magistrates are members of the local community without legal training. The system is based on the ideal that local justice be served by local people.

In England and Wales, magistrates make decisions on some two million defendants per year. They sit in court for a morning or afternoon every one or two weeks and make bail decisions as a bench of two or three. The Bail Act of 1976 and its subsequent revisions (Dhami & Ayton, 2001) require that magistrates pay regard to the nature and seriousness of the offense; to the character, community ties, and bail record of the defendant; and to the strength of the prosecution case, the likely sentence if convicted, and any other factor that appears to be relevant. Yet the law is silent on how magistrates should weigh and integrate these pieces of information, and the legal institutions do not provide feedback on whether their decisions were in fact appropriate or not. The magistrates are left to their own intuitions.

How do magistrates actually make these millions of decisions? To answer this question, several hundred trials were observed in two London courts over a four-month period (Dhami, 2003). The average time a bench spent with each case was less than 10 minutes. The analysis of the actual bail decisions indicated a fast and frugal heuristic that accounts for 95% of all bail decisions in Court A (see figure 1.1, left; cross-validation performance: 92%). When the prosecution requested conditional bail, the magistrates also made a punitive decision. If not, or if no information was available, a second reason came into play. If a previous court had imposed conditions or remanded in custody, then the magistrates also made a punitive decision. If not, or if no information was available, they followed the action of the police.

The bail decisions in Court B could be modeled by the same heuristic, except that one of the reasons was different (see figure 1.1, right). The benches in both courts relied on the same defensive rationale, which is known as “passing the buck.” The magistrates’ heuristics raise an ethical issue. In both London courts, they violate due process. Each bench based
a punitive decision on one reason only, such as whether the police had imposed conditions or imprisonment. One could argue that the police or prosecution had already looked at all the evidence concerning the defendant, and therefore magistrates simply used their recommendation as a shortcut (although this argument would make magistrates dispensable). However, the reasons guiding the heuristics were not correlated with the nature and seriousness of the offense or with other pieces of information relevant for due process.

The bail study investigated magistrates in their original social context (a bench of two or three laypeople) and in their natural environment (magistrates work in an institution that provides no systematic feedback about the quality of their decisions, and they can only be proven wrong if they bailed a defendant who then committed an offense; see below). Are its results consistent with the three hypotheses? With respect to the first hypothesis, the bail study can, at best, provide proof of the existence of fast and frugal heuristics but does not allow the conclusion that a substantial part of moral action is based on them. The answer to the second
hypothesis, that the structure of moral heuristics mirrors that of other heuristics, however, is positive. The two bail heuristics have the same structure as a class of cognitive heuristics called “fast and frugal trees” (Katsikopoulos & Martignon, 2004). Unlike in a full tree, a decision is possible at each node of the tree. For three binary reasons with values [0, 1], where “1” allows for an immediate decision, the general structure of a fast and frugal tree is as follows:

Consider the first reason: If the value is “1,” stop search and choose the corresponding action. Otherwise,
Consider the second reason. If the value is “1,” stop search and choose the corresponding action. Otherwise,
Consider the third reason: If the value is “1,” choose action A; otherwise choose B.

Fast and frugal trees are a subclass of heuristics that employ sequential search through reasons (Gigerenzer, 2004). The bail heuristics embody a form of one-reason decision making: Although more than one reason may be considered, the punitive decision itself is based on only one reason. The decision is noncompensatory, which means that reasons located further down the tree cannot compensate for or overturn a decision made higher up in the tree. In other words, the heuristic makes no trade-offs. Note that sequential heuristics can embody interactions, such as that bail is given only if neither prosecution, nor previous court, nor police opposed bail. Fast and frugal trees play a role in situations beyond the trustworthiness of a defendant, such as in medical decision making (Fischer et al., 2002; Green & Mehr, 1997).

Third, are magistrates aware of what underlies their judgments? When asked to explain their decisions, their stories were strikingly different. A typical answer was that they thoroughly examined all the evidence on a defendant in order to treat the individual fairly and without bias, and that they based their decision on the full evidence. For instance, one explained that the decision “depends on an enormous weight of balancing information, together with our experience and training” (Dhami & Ayton, 2001, p. 163). Another said that “the decisions of magistrates are indeed complex, each case is an ‘individual case’” (Dhami, 2001, p. 255). Furthermore, magistrates actually asked for information concerning the defendant, which they subsequently ignored in their decisions. Unless the magistrates deliberately deceived the public about how they make bail decisions (and I have no grounds to assume so), one must conclude on the basis of the models in figure 1.1 that they are largely unaware of the
heuristics they use. This dissociation between the reported reasons and the actual reasons (as modeled in the bail heuristics) is consistent with what Konecli and Ebbesen (1984) refer to as the “mythology of legal decision making” (p. 5).

Models of Moral Heuristics

There is a classical distinction between rationalist and nonrationalist theories of moral judgment. Is moral judgment the result of reasoning and reflection, as in Kohlberg’s (1969) and Piaget’s (1932/1965) theories? Or is it an intuitive process, as in Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionism perspective, based on Hume’s ideas? Rationalist theories assume that reasoning comes first and that moral intuition is its product, whereas social intuitionist theories assume that moral intuition typically comes first and reasoning is a post hoc attempt to justify an intuition to an audience. I suggest that the intuitions can be explicated by heuristics relying on reasons. The opposition is not between intuition and reasoning, in my view, but between the (unconscious) reasons underlying intuition and the conscious, after-the-fact reasons. The magistrates’ judgments, for instance, can be explained by a simple heuristic based on three reasons, yet they believed they were engaging in highly complex reasoning. This point fits well with the social intuitionist view of moral judgment, where rationalization is ex post facto rather than the cause of the decision (Haidt, 2001). Moreover, the heuristics perspective can extend the intuitionist view in two directions: It provides an analysis of the heuristic process and of the environment.

Why Processes Models Are Essential

Unlike views that treat intuition as an unexplained primitive notion or attribute it to feelings as opposed to reasons, the heuristics perspective asks to specify models of what underlies moral intuition. The descriptive goal of the heuristics program is to spell out what the heuristics underlying intuition are and how they differ from the post hoc rationalization of one’s judgment. This is a call for models and for going beyond mere labels for heuristics, such as “availability” and “representativeness” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996). Mere labels and ying–yang lists of dichotomies such as “System 1 versus System 2” can account post hoc for everything and nothing (Gigerenzer, 1996, 1998; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996). For decades, these surrogates for theories have hindered progress in the psychology of judgment. We instead need testable theories of cognitive processes, such as shown in figure 1.1. It is a striking paradox that many cognitive and
social psychologists practice “black-box behaviorism.” They don’t seem to dare or care to open the box more than an inch, and they throw in a “one-word explanation” (e.g., salience, availability) before quickly shutting it again. B. F. Skinner would have been happy to see cognitive psychologists voluntarily abstain from theories of cognitive processes.

Models of heuristics demonstrate that the dichotomy between intuitions and reasons has its limits. Like conscious reasoning, sequential search heuristics—as shown in figure 1.1—rely on reasons. After all, one could make the bail heuristics public, implement them into a computer program, and replace the entire British bail system. Moral intuitions can be based on reasons, even if the latter are unconscious. These reasons, however, need not be the same as those given post hoc in public. In addition, moral intuition can ignore most or even all reasons, as in the case of simply copying the moral action of one’s peers.

Yet why do we need models of heuristic processes underlying moral intuitions? Could one not simply say that people behave as if they were maximizing justice, well-being, or happiness? Consider the task of catching a ball again. Could one not simply say, as the biologist Richard Dawkins (1989) put it, “When a man throws a ball high in the air and catches it again, he behaves as if he had solved a set of differential equations in predicting the trajectory of the ball” (p. 96)? As-if theories do not describe how people actually solve a problem, in courts or sports. However, not knowing the heuristics can have unwanted consequences. I once gave a talk on the gaze heuristic, and a professor of business administration came up to me and told me the following story. Phil (not his real name) played baseball for the local team. His coach scolded him for being lazy, because Phil sometimes trotted over, as others did, toward the point where the ball came down. The angry coach insisted that he instead run as fast as he could. However, when Phil and his teammates tried to run at top speed, they often missed the ball. Phil had played as an outfielder for years and had never understood how he caught the ball. Unaware of the gaze heuristic and the other heuristics players use, the coach assumed something like the as-if model and did not realize that the heuristic dictates the speed at which a player runs, and that running too fast will impede performance. Phil’s case illustrates that knowing the heuristic can be essential to correcting wrong conclusions drawn from an as-if model.

I argue that in the moral domain it is equally important to analyze the processes underlying people’s helpful or harmful behavior in order to improve a situation. For instance, by starting with the assumption that the magistrates behaved as if they were maximizing the welfare of defendants
and society, one would miss how the system works and not be able to improve it. Now that we have—for the first time—a good model of the magistrates’ underlying heuristics, it is possible to assess the system and ask the critical questions. Are magistrates necessary at all? And, if the answer is positive, how can one improve their heuristics as well as a legal system that supports defensive justice rather than due process?

**Institutions Shape Intuitions**
The science of heuristics emphasizes the analysis of the “external” environment, in addition to the “internal” heuristics. Heuristics that shape moral intuitions are in part a consequence of the external environment, and vice versa. How does an institution shape heuristics?

The legal institution in which magistrates operate seems to support their mental dissociation. The law requests that magistrates follow due process. The magistrates’ official task is to do justice to a defendant and the public, that is, to minimize the two possible errors one can make. This first error occurs when a suspect is released on bail and subsequently commits another crime, threatens a witness, or does not appear in court. The second error occurs when a suspect who would not have committed any of these offenses is imprisoned. However, as mentioned before, English legal institutions collect no systematic information about the quality of magistrates’ decisions. Even if statistics were kept about when and how often the first error occurs, it would be impossible to do the same for the second error, simply because one cannot find out whether an imprisoned person would have committed a crime if he or she had been bailed. That is, the magistrates operate in an institution that does not or cannot provide feedback about how well they protect the defendant and the public. They effectively cannot learn how to solve the intended task, and the bail heuristics suggest that they instead try to solve a different one: to protect themselves rather than the defendant. Magistrates can only be proven to have made a bad decision if a suspect who was released committed an offense or crime while on bail. If this happens, the bail heuristic protects them against accusations by the media or the victims. The magistrates in Court A, for instance, can always argue that neither the prosecution, nor a previous court, nor the police had imposed or requested a punitive decision. Thus, the event was not foreseeable. An analysis of the institution can help to understand the nature of the heuristics people use and why they believe they are doing something else.

More generally, consider an institution that requires their employees to perform a duty. The employees can commit two kinds of errors: false alarms
and misses. If an institution (1) does not provide systematic feedback concerning false alarms and misses but (2) blames the employees if a miss occurs, the institution fosters employees’ self-protection over the protection of their clients, and it supports self-deception. I call this environmental structure a “split-brain institution.” The term is borrowed from the fascinating studies of people whose corpus callosum—the connection between the right and left cerebral hemispheres—has been severed (Gazzaniga, 1985). Split-brain patients confabulate post hoc stories with the left (verbal) side of their brain to rationalize information or phenomena perceived by the right (nonverbal) side of their brain, which they are apparently unaware of. The analogy only holds to a point. Unlike a split-brain patient, a split-brain institution can impose moral sanctions for confabulating and punishment for awareness of what one does. If magistrates were fully aware of their heuristics, a conflict with the ideal of due process would ensue. Medical institutions often have a similar split-brain structure. Consider a health system that allows patients to visit a sequence of specialized doctors but does not provide systematic feedback to these doctors concerning the efficacy of their treatments, and in which doctors are likely to be sued by the patient for having overlooked a disease but not for overtreatment and overmedication. Such a system fosters doctors’ self-protection over the protection of their patients and supports similar self-deception as in the case of the magistrates.

Should We Rely on Moral Heuristics?

The answer seems to be “no.” Heuristics ignore information, do not explore all possible actions and their consequences, and do not try to optimize and find the best solution. Thus, for those theories that assume that all consequences of all possible actions should be taken into account to determine the best action, fast and frugal heuristics appear to be questionable guidelines. Even social intuitionists who argue against rationalist theories as a valid descriptive theory are anxious not to extend their theory to the normative level. For instance, Haidt (2001) is quick to point out that intuition is not about how judgments should be made, and he cites demonstrations that “moral intuitions often bring about nonoptimal or even disastrous consequences in matters of public policy, public health, and the tort system” (p. 815). Understanding nonrational intuitions may be “useful in helping decision makers avoid mistakes and in helping educators design programs (and environments) to improve the quality of moral judgment and behavior” (p. 815). The same negative conclusion can be derived from
the heuristics-and-biases program (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000), where heuristics are opposed to the laws of logic, probability, or utility maximization, and only the latter are defended as normative. Sunstein (2005), for instance, applies this approach to moral intuitions and emphasizes that heuristics lead to mistaken and even absurd moral judgments. Just as Kahneman and Tversky claimed to know the only correct answer to a reasoning problem (a controversial claim; see Gigerenzer 1996, 2000), Sunstein has a clear idea of what is right and wrong for many moral issue he discusses, and he holds people’s moral heuristics responsible for their negligence, wrong-doing, and evil. Despite laudable attempts to propose models of heuristics, he relies on vague terms such as “availability” and “dual-process models.” Yet, without some degree of precision, one cannot spell out in what environment a given heuristic would work or not work. All these views seem to converge to a unanimous consensus: Heuristics are always second-best solutions, which describe what people do but do not qualify as guidelines for moral action.

The view that heuristics can be prescriptive, not only descriptive, distinguishes the study of the adaptive toolbox from the heuristics-and-biases program. Both programs reject rational choice or, more generally, optimization as a general descriptive theory, arguing instead that people often use heuristics to make decisions. However, the heuristics-and-biases program stops short when it comes to the question of “ought.” The study of ecological rationality, in contrast, offers a more radical revision of rational choice, including its prescriptive part. The gaze heuristic illustrates that ignoring all causal variables and relying on one-reason decision making can be ecologically rational for a class of problems that involve the interception of moving objects. More generally, today we know of conditions under which less information is better than more, for instance, when relying on only one reason leads to predictions that are as good as or better than by weighting and adding a dozen reasons (Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2005; Martignon & Höffrage, 1999). We also understand situations where limited cognitive capacities can enable language learning (Ellman, 1993) and covariation detection (Kareev, 2000) better than larger capacities do (Hertwig & Todd, 2003). Simple heuristics, which ignore part of the available information, are not only faster and cheaper but also more accurate for environments that can be specified precisely. I cannot go into detail here, but the general reason for these counterintuitive results are that, unlike logic and rational choice models, heuristics exploit evolved abilities and structures of environments, including their uncertainty (Gigerenzer, 2004). This opens up the
possibility that when it comes to issues of justice and morals, there are situations in which the use of heuristics, as opposed to an exhaustive analysis of possible actions and consequences, is preferable.

Can heuristics be prescriptive? As I said earlier, unlike in inferences and predictions where a clear-cut criterion exists, in the moral domain one can only analyze the situations in which a heuristic is ecologically rational if a normative criterion is introduced. For inference tasks, such as classification and paired comparison, heuristics are evaluated by predictive accuracy, frugality, speed, and transparency. Some of these criteria may be relevant for moral issues. For instance, transparent rules and laws may be seen as a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for creating trust and reassurance in a society, whereas nontransparent rules and arbitrary punishments are the hallmark of totalitarian systems. Transparency also implies that the number of laws is few, as in the Ten Commandments of Christianity. In many situations, however, there is no single agreed norm. But I believe that one should face rather than deny normative uncertainty.

Last but not least, the science of heuristics can provide a better understanding of the limits of normative theories of morality. I illustrate this point with versions of consequentialism and similar theories that are based on the moral ideal of maximization.

The Problem with Maximization Theories

The idea that rational choice means the maximization of the expected value has been attributed to the seventeenth-century French mathematicians Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat and dated to their exchange of letters in 1654. Pascal used the calculus for a moral problem: whether or not to believe in God (Daston, 1988). He argued that this decision should not be based on blind faith or blind atheism but on considering the consequences of each action. There are two possible errors. If one believes in God but he does not exist, one will forgo a few worldly pleasures. However, if one does not believe in God but he exists, eternal damnation and suffering will result. Therefore, Pascal argued, however small the probability that God exists, the known consequences dictate that believing in God is rational. What counts are the consequences of actions, not the actions themselves. “Seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number”—the slogan associated with Jeremy Bentham—is a version of this maximization principle, a form of hedonistic utilitarianism where the standard is not the agent’s own happiness but that of the greatest number of people. Today, many forms of utilitarianism and consequentialism exist, both normative and descriptive (see Smart, 1967).
My question is, can utilitarianism and consequentialism provide (1) a norm and (2) a description of moral action in the real world? I emphasize the “real world” as opposed to a textbook problem such as the trolley problem, where I assume, for the sake of argument, that the answer is “yes.” When I use the term consequentialism in the following, I refer to theories that postulate maximizing, implicitly or explicitly: “in any form of direct consequentialism, and certainly in act-utilitarianism, the notion of the right action in given circumstances is a maximizing notion” (Williams, 1988, p. 23; see also Smart, 1973). Just as in Pascal’s moral calculus, and Daniel Bernoulli’s maximization of subjective expected utility, this form of consequentialism is about the optimal (best) action, not just one that is good enough. It demands optimizing, not satisficing.

To find the action with the best consequences is not a simple feat in the real world. It requires determining the set of all possible actions, all possible consequences, their probabilities, and their utilities. There are at least four interpretations of this process of maximizing:

- a conscious mental process (e.g., to think through all possible actions and consequences),
- an unconscious mental process (the brain does it for you, but you don’t notice the process, only the result),
- an as-if theory of behavior (people behave as if they computed the action with the highest utility; no claim for a conscious or unconscious mental process), and
- a normative goal (maximizing determines which action one ought to choose; no claim as a model of either process or behavior).

Proponents of consequentialism have emphasized that their theory is not just a fiction created by some philosophers and economists and handed down to moral scholars. It is written into law (Posner, 1972). According to U.S. tort law, an action is called “negligent” and the actor is likely to pay damages if the probability of resulting harm multiplied by the cost of harm to others exceeds the benefit of the action to the actor. This is known as the “Learned Hand formula,” named after Judge Learned Hand, who proposed the formula for determining negligence in 1947. If the expected damage is less than the expected benefit, the actor is not liable for damages, even if the risked harm came to pass.

Yet there is a second part to this story. Although Judge Learned Hand has been acclaimed as an early proponent of maximization and consequentialism, he also held the view that “all such attempts [to quantify the determinants of liability] are illusory; and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center attention upon which one of the factors may be determinate in
any given situation” (Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 [2d Cir 1949]; see Kysar et al., 2006). Here, Judge Hand seems to favor one-reason decision making, such as fast and frugal decision trees and Take The Best (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). This second part illustrates some of the problems with maximization in the real world, which I will now turn to.

Computational Limits
By definition, consequentialism (in the sense of maximization) can only give guidelines for moral action if the best action can actually be determined by a mind or machine. I argue that this is typically not the case in the real world. To the degree that this is true, consequentialism is confined to well-defined moral problems with a limited time horizon and a small set of possible actions and consequences that do not allow uncertainty and surprises. Moral textbook problems in the philosophical literature have this impoverished structure (Williams, 1988).

Consider, in contrast, a moral game that has the structure of chess—a choice set of about 30 possible actions per move, a temporal horizon of a sequence of some 20 moves, and two players. One player acts, the other reacts, and so on, with 10 moves for each person. For each move, both players can choose to act in 1 out of the 30 possible ways—to tell the truth, to lie, to cheat, to form an alliance, to withhold information, to insult, to threaten, to blackmail, and so on. The opponent then responds with 1 of the 30 possible actions, and so on. The game is well defined; no negotiation of rules or self-serving changes are allowed. Every action in this game of social chess depends on those of the other person, so one has to look ahead to understand the consequences of one’s own action. Can one determine the best sequence of actions in this game? Although the game looks like a somewhat impoverished human interaction, no mind or machine can enumerate and evaluate all consequences. A simple calculation will illustrate this.

For each action, there are 30 possibilities, which makes in 20 moves $30^{20}$

possible sequences of moves. Can a human mind evaluate all of these consequences? No. Can our fastest computers do it? Deep Blue, the IBM chess computer, can examine some 200 million possible moves per second. How long would it take Deep Blue to think through all consequences in social chess and choose the move that maximizes utility? Even at its breathtaking speed, Deep Blue would need some 55,000 billion years to think 20
moves ahead and pick the best one. (Recall that the Big Bang is estimated to have occurred only some 14 billion years ago.) But 20 moves are not yet a complete game of chess or of human interaction. In technical terms, social chess is “computationally intractable” for minds and machines.

If we increased the number of people interacting from two to three or more, we would encounter a new obstacle for maximization. Just as the predictive power of physics ends with a three-body problem—such as earth, moon, and sun, moving under no influence other than their mutual gravitation—there is no best way to predict the dynamics of the mutual attractions of three or more people. This computational problem arises both in competitive and cooperative games if they are played in an uncertain world rather than in a small closed one. My conclusion is that consequentialism, understood as the maximization of some measure of utility or happiness, can only work with a limited time perspective and limited interactions. Beyond these limits, consequentialism can neither be prescriptive nor descriptive.

When Maximization Is Out of Reach
More generally, situations for which maximization—in consequentialism or other moral theories—is impossible, include the following:

1. Computationally intractable problems These are well-defined problems, such as chess and the computer games Tetris and Minesweeper. No mind or machine can compute the optimal solution in real time. For instance, when former chess world champion Kasparov played against the IBM chess program Deep Blue, both had to rely on heuristics. The reason is not simply because people or computers have limited cognitive capacities but because the problem is computationally intractable. This is not necessarily bad news. Games where we know the optimal solution (such as tic-tac-toe) are boring for exactly this reason. The same holds for moral issues. If social chess were computable, part of our emotional life would become obsolete. We would always know how to behave optimally, as would our partners. There would be fewer things to hope for, and less surprise, joy, disappointment, and regret.

2. The criterion cannot be measured with sufficient precision For instance, there is no way to optimize the acoustics of a concert hall because experts consistently disagree about what constitutes good acoustics. The same applies to many moral criteria. The criterion of consequentialist theory—“happiness,” “pleasure,” or “utility”—is at least as difficult to measure as the acoustics of a concert hall, and for similar reasons. People, including
experts, will not agree what consequences make them and others most happy, and there are societies where happiness means little in comparison to religious faith and loyalty to one's national and cultural identity. Thus, the criterion of the greatest happiness for everyone may become increasingly fuzzy the farther one travels from one's social group. The same problem arises for norms of egalitarianism. Moral philosophers have long discussed what should be equal: opportunity, rights, income, welfare, capabilities, or something else? A heuristic may focus on those few that can be observed most easily in a given situation (Messick, 1993). However, the general problem of optimizing equality has no solution because of lack of sufficient precision.

3. *Multiple goals or criteria* Optimization is, in general, impossible for problems with multiple criteria. One cannot maximize several criteria simultaneously (unless one combines them by, say, a linear function). For instance, even if the traveling salesman problem could be solved (it cannot for large numbers of cities), its real-world equivalent has multiple criteria, not only the shortest route. These can involve the fastest route, the cheapest route, and the most scenic route. Multiple criteria or goals, however, are characteristic of moral dilemmas. Examples are paternity cases where one wants to find the truth but also protect the child from being uprooted, while doing justice to the rights of the genetic parents and the foster family. Similarly, when happiness is not of one kind, but of several, one cannot maximize all of these simultaneously.

4. *Calculative rationality can be seen as morally unacceptable* In certain domains, the idea of choosing the option with the best anticipated consequences can violate people's moral sense. These include kinship, friendship, and mate choice. When a man (or woman) proceeds rationally by empirically investigating all potential partners, the possible consequences of living with them, and the probabilities and utilities of each consequence, moral outrage from those being investigated can result. In 1611, for instance, the astronomer Johannes Kepler began a methodical search for his second wife after an arranged and unhappy first marriage. He investigated 11 possible replacements within 2 years. Friends urged him to marry Candidate No. 4, a woman of high status and tempting dowry, but she eventually rejected him for toying with her too long. The attempt to rationally determine the best alternative can be perceived as morally repulsive. Former First Lady Barbara Bush, in contrast, seemed to have undertaken little comparative study: "I married the first man I ever kissed. When I tell this to my children, they just about throw up" (Todd & Miller, 1999).
5. **Optimization can destroy trust**  If an employer tried to optimize and dismissed his employees and subcontracters every year in order to hire the best ones, he might destroy loyalty, identification, and trust (Baumol, 2004). In contrast, heuristics such as satisficing entail an implicit promise to current employees that as long as their performance and development continue to be satisfactory, that is, meet an aspiration level, no changes will be made. This makes it attractive for employees to adapt their services to the needs of the firm. The value in commitments holds outside of business environments. When a university admits a graduate student, it is typically understood that there is no annual contest among students inside and outside the university for reallocating stipends competitively to the students who look best at any point in time. Rather, the support will be continued for the next several years, as long as the student’s performance continues to meet standards of acceptability.

6. **Ill-defined problems**  Most problems in the real world are ill-defined, that is, the set of possible actions is not known, their consequences cannot be foreseen, the probabilities and utilities are unknown, and the rules of the game are not fixed but are negotiated during the game. In these situations, maximization—of collective happiness or anything else—is, by definition, impossible.

The fact that maximization (optimization) is typically out of reach in the real world is widely ignored in philosophy, economics, and the cognitive sciences. This state of affairs has been called the “fiction of optimization” (Klein, 2001; see also Selten, 2001). Several tools for rescuing maximization are in use. One is to assume that people are unboundedly rational, that is, that they know all actions, consequences, and other information needed to calculate the best option. A second tool is to edit a computationally intractable real-world problem into one that is small enough so that the optimization calculus can be applied. However, as Herbert Simon (1955, p. 102) argued long ago, there is a complete lack of evidence that in real-world situations of any complexity, these computations can be or actually are performed. In contrast, in applied sciences such as robotics and machine learning, it is common wisdom that in order to solve real-world problems, one needs to develop heuristic methods.

**Toward an Investigation of Moral Heuristics**

In this essay, I argued that many—not all—moral actions can be understood as based on fast and frugal heuristics. Specifically, moral intuitions can be explicated by models of heuristics. These heuristics are strong
enough to act upon, yet people are typically not aware of their underlying rationale. Understanding heuristics requires an analysis of the social environment in which people act, because heuristics take advantage of environments and environments select heuristics. Analyzing the environment also helps to understand systematic discrepancies between the reasons people give for their moral intuitions and the underlying heuristics. To the degree that moral action is guided by heuristics, it can be influenced by changing the conditions that trigger a given heuristic. This includes the framing of an offer, as illustrated in the case of Major Trapp, and the choice of the default, as in the case of organ donation. Unlike theories that focus on traits, preferences, attitudes, and other internal constructs, the science of heuristics emphasizes the interaction between mind and social environment. Knowing the heuristics that guide people’s moral actions can be of help in designing change that might otherwise be out of reach.

Notes

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1. Browning (1993, p. xvii). I chose this sensitive example because it is one of the best-documented mass murders in history, with the unique feature that the policemen were given the opportunity not to participate in the killing. My short account cannot do justice to the complexity of the situation, and I recommend consulting Browning’s book, including the afterword, in which he deals with his critics such as Daniel Goldhagen. Browning (e.g., pp. 209–216) offers a multilayered portrayal of the battalion during their first and subsequent mass killings. The largest group of policemen ended up doing whatever they were asked to, avoiding the risk of confronting authority or appearing to be cowards, yet not volunteering to kill. Increasingly numbed by the violence, they did not think that what they were doing was immoral, because it was sanctioned by authority. In fact, most tried not to think at all. A second group of “eager” killers who celebrated their murderous deeds increased in numbers over time. The smallest group were the nonshooters, who, with the exception of one lieutenant, neither protested against the regime nor reproached their comrades.

2. Some psychologists do invoke a “dual-process model” that postulates an “intuitive system” and a “reasoning system” to account for the difference between moral intuition and reasoning. In my opinion, however, this amounts to a redescription of the phenomenon rather than an explanation; contrary to what its name suggests, this model does not specify any process underlying intuition or reasoning but consists of a list of dichotomies (Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996).
1.1 Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong

Cass R. Sunstein

For many problems, Gerd Gigerenzer celebrates heuristics. He believes that they are simple, fast, frugal, and remarkably accurate. He emphasizes that heuristics can be prescriptive, in the sense that they may well lead to good outcomes in the real world. In the moral domain, Gigerenzer is properly cautious about whether heuristics produce moral or immoral behavior. What I would like to do here is to emphasize the imperfect reliability of heuristics in general and to suggest that their imperfect reliability raises serious cautionary notes about some of Gigerenzer's broader claims.

Let us begin with Gigerenzer's illuminating remarks about the "gaze heuristic," which enables baseball players (and others) to make otherwise difficult catches. Gigerenzer, who has often explored this particular heuristic, is quite right to emphasize that people who use heuristics are often not aware that they are doing so. But even a casual understanding of sports requires some qualification of Gigerenzer's claims. Stupid tennis players tend to use fast and frugal heuristics, which contribute to their stupid tennis. Often they think, for example, that they should hit the ball hard and deep whenever the opportunity arises—an intuition, or thought, that can get them into serious trouble. Stupid athletes adopt simple heuristics that make them dumb. By contrast, smart tennis players are immensely flexible, and they are able to rethink their rules of thumb as the occasion demands. The best athletes have an exceedingly complex set of heuristics, fast but not at all simple, which they deploy as the situation requires. The moral domain is not so very different (see Nussbaum, 2003). It is pervaded by fast heuristics, as Gigerenzer suggests, but they often misfire, and good moral agents are aware of that fact.

My own treatment of moral heuristics, criticized by Gigerenzer, emphasizes the immense importance of moral framing and the possibility that people use "simple heuristics that make us good" (Sunstein, 2005). For morality, as for issues of fact and logic, it is important to see that many
heuristics do point us in the right direction—and hence to stress, as did Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and later Gigerenzer, that heuristics can lead to excellent judgments in the actual world. If people believe that they ought not to lie, or harm innocent people, they will often do the right thing—especially in light of the fact that case-by-case inquiries into the morality of lying, or harming innocent people, could produce self-serving conclusions that produce grievous moral wrong. (The case of Nazi massacres, explored by Gigerenzer, can be understood as an example.) Moral heuristics, understood as simple rules of thumb, might well have a rule-utilitarian defense, in the sense that they might, on balance, produce morally preferable behavior even if they lead to unfortunate results in particular cases.

But no one should deny that in many contexts, moral and other heuristics, in the form of simple rules of thumb, lead to moral error on any plausible view of morality. Consider, for example, the idea, emphasized by Gigerenzer, that one ought to do as the majority does, a source of massive moral blunders (see Sunstein, 2003). Or consider the fast and frugal idea that one ought not to distort the truth—a heuristic that generally works well but that also leads (in my view) to moral error when, for example, the distortion is necessary to avoid significant numbers of deaths. Or consider the act–omission distinction, which makes moral sense in many domains but which can lead to unsupportable moral judgments as well.

Gigerenzer notes, usefully, that it may be possible to modify people’s judgments, including their moral judgments, by altering the background. The idea is hardly original, but it is true that a default rule in favor of organ donations might well increase what, on one view, is morally desirable behavior. Indeed there are many applications of this point. If default rules matter, an employer, including the state qua employer, could dramatically increase charitable contributions by presuming that (for example) each employee would like to devote 2% of wages to charitable causes. Of course, the use of default rules to steer behavior raises normative questions of its own. The only point is that default rules greatly matter to choices, including those with a moral component.

Thus far, then, Gigerenzer’s general argument seems both plausible and illuminating, and I am merely underlining the possibility that even good heuristics will go wrong, for morality as for other questions. But on an important issue, Gigerenzer seems to me to miss some of the complexity of moral argument. His objections to maximization theories treat moral judgments as involving a kind of moral arithmetic, and this is a most contentious understanding.
To be sure, Gigerenzer is correct to stress the cognitive difficulties of undertaking a full ex ante calculation of the consequences of social actions. Human beings do not have unlimited cognitive abilities, and hence they are often unable to specify the effects of one or another course of action. Gigerenzer believes that satisficers, using moral heuristics, have important advantages over optimizers. For some questions, this is undoubtedly correct. But to understand the relationship between heuristics and the moral domain, much more must be said. Three points are especially important here.

First: Gigerenzer does not mention that many people are rule consequentialists; they know exactly what Gigerenzer emphasizes, and they favor clear and simple moral rules for that very reason (Hooker, 2000). A complex consequentialist calculus might lead to error, even if it would be preferable if properly applied. Because people are self-serving, and because their on-the-spot judgments are unreliable, they might do best to follow simple moral rules or one-reason decision making. There are interesting relationships between Gigerenzer’s understanding of heuristics and a rule-utilitarian approach to morality.

Second: Consequentialism can be specified in many different ways. Utilitarianism is one form of consequentialism, but because it requires all goods and bads to be described along the metric of utility, it is controversial, even among consequentialists. When Gigerenzer speaks of the limits of maximization theories, and even of consequentialism, he appears to be operating under a utilitarian framework, without exploring the problem of plural and incommensurable goods. We might, for example, endorse a form of consequentialism that sees rights violations (so understood on nonutilitarian grounds) as a set of (very) bad consequences (see Sen, 1982). Gigerenzer’s exploration of moral problems does not recognize the complexities in consequentialist accounts of morality.

Third: Many people are not consequentialists at all (see Scheffler, 1994). Consider the injunction to treat people as ends, not means, an injunction that runs afoul of many versions of consequentialism (but see Sen, 1982). Hence—and this is the most important point—it is not enough for Gigerenzer to show that moral heuristics do a good (enough) real-world job of achieving what we would achieve if we were optimizers with unlimited abilities of calculation. Perhaps some heuristics, in some contexts, violate deontological commands.

Return to Gigerenzer’s first example: Should a Nazi massacre be evaluated in utilitarian or consequentialist terms? To make the calculation, does it matter if, for example, there were many more Nazis than Jews, and that
many Germans had a great deal to gain, economically and otherwise, from mass murders? Many people would respond that this moral atrocity counts as such whatever the outcome of a utilitarian or consequentialist calculus—and hence that Gigerenzer’s emphasis on the impossibility of ex ante calculations is often beside the point (or worse). Perhaps many moral heuristics, followed by most people and even most soldiers (putting Nazi soldiers to one side), should be seen as fast and frugal ways not of satisficing rather than optimizing but of ensuring that people do what is required by nonconsequentialist accounts of morality.

The existence of plural and conflicting accounts of the foundations of morality makes it all the more difficult to argue that moral heuristics function well. If certain fast and frugal heuristics are defensible on utilitarian or consequentialist grounds, they might still be objectionable from the moral point of view. In my view, it is for this reason productive to explore heuristics that might be defensible, or indefensible, on the basis of any view of what morality requires or on the basis of the least contentious views of what morality requires (Sunstein, 2005).

Gigerenzer seems to think that moral heuristics might be shown to be prescriptive if a full consequentialist calculus is not possible, but this thought too quickly treats morality as a problem of arithmetic. If morality ought not to be so understood, as many people believe, then it is not clear what is shown by Gigerenzer’s emphasis on the cognitive problems associated with optimizing. I emphasize that prescriptive treatments of moral heuristics are likely to be productive, but they should steer clear of the most contentious arguments about the foundations of morality.
1.2 Moral Heuristics and Consequentialism

Julia Driver and Don Loeb

Professor Gerd Gigerenzer’s work on fast and frugal heuristics is fascinating and has been extremely influential, in a very positive way, on research in the psychology of human action. There is much in Gigerenzer’s work that we agree with. For example, he has effectively demonstrated that people often perform intentional actions using heuristics rather than complicated decision procedures. Further, he has plausibly argued for various ways in which these heuristics work, focusing on actual cases—such as the way persons normally go about catching balls, which relies in part on the gaze heuristic. We agree that much moral action is not guided by any process of conscious decision making or calculation, and we find interesting and promising the suggestion that fast and frugal heuristics are sometimes responsible for people’s actions and moral judgments.

Furthermore, knowing how the mind works in solving problems or accomplishing tasks is useful for anyone concerned about ethics. Gigerenzer’s suggestions about institutional design, the recognition of programmed responses that lead to good or bad results, and the ways these can be modified are all very constructive indeed. While we have reservations about certain elements of his descriptive argument, we will, for the most part, leave such issues to the psychologists and focus on normative matters. When it comes to such matters, however, there is much that we disagree with. In particular, we think, his treatment of prescriptive issues blurs significant distinctions and unfairly characterizes traditional philosophical methods of reasoning about ethics. Most importantly, we think, his attack on consequentialism is seriously misguided. Before turning to these prescriptive matters, however, we offer a few concerns about the descriptive claims.

Some Worries about Gigerenzer’s Descriptive Claims

In a couple of cases, Gigerenzer’s descriptive claims seem less than fully warranted. For example, in a fascinating and illuminating discussion of
the behavior of bail magistrates in London, he shows that the vast number of these magistrates’ decisions fit a much simpler, tree-like decision procedure, rather than the multifactor analysis they believe themselves to be employing. While we can think of unanswered questions about the magistrates’ decisions, we do not wish to (and indeed are not in a position to) claim that Gigerenzer’s analysis is incorrect. Still, we think it unfair to suggest that instead of trying to do justice, the magistrates’ “heuristics suggest that they instead try to solve a different [problem]; to protect themselves rather than the defendant” (p. 32). There is often a difference between what people do and what they are trying to do. And without better evidence, we should be reluctant to suggest that well-meaning people are following the CYA (try to avoid anticipated criticisms) heuristic.¹

Another place in which we are suspicious of Gigerenzer’s descriptive claims involves his defense of the claim that “knowing the heuristic can be essential to correcting wrong conclusions drawn from an as-if model” (p. 16). He discusses the case of a baseball-playing professor who, on the advice of his coach, began to run as fast as he could toward fly balls, with disastrous results. “The coach,” we are told, “assumed something like the as-if model” (p. 16) and did not realize that knowing the heuristic was essential to correcting this error. The former claim seems implausible; the as-if model seems to recommend advising the player not to change a thing. We suggest that a player who behaves as if he intends to catch the ball is much more likely to succeed than one who attempts to employ the gaze heuristic instead. While following the heuristics can lead to success, attending to them may well lead to failure.²

Finally, Gigerenzer hypothesizes that even intuitions are based on reasons (in the form of heuristics) and thus that we can substitute a conscious versus unconscious reasoning distinction for the more traditional feeling versus reason distinction found in philosophical and psychological debates about how moral decisions are made. However, we must be careful here. That heuristics underlie some of our intuitive responses does not show that reasoning, in any ordinary sense of the term, underlies them. That there is a reason (in the sense of an explanation or cause) for our behaving in a certain way—even an explanation having to do with the behavior’s effectiveness at achieving some end—does not mean that we have unconsciously reasoned to that end. By analogy, and as Gigerenzer would be the first to acknowledge, evolution produces results that often resemble products of reasoning, but this is an illusion.
Worries about Gigerenzer’s Prescriptive Claims

We now turn to Gigerenzer’s discussion of the possibility that heuristics can be prescriptive, as well as descriptive. Here we think Gigerenzer treads on much more hazardous ground. He begins with a horrifying example involving Nazi policemen who had to decide whether or not to take part in a massacre. A surprisingly small number decided not to participate. Professor Gigerenzer attributes the majority’s shocking failure to remove themselves from the massacre to a heuristic, “Don’t break ranks.” Their behavior can be explained, though not justified, by this heuristic, he thinks. Indeed, the example makes quite clear that Gigerenzer does not think the mere fact that we tend to employ a given heuristic makes it morally acceptable to do so.

However, that leaves unclear what Gigerenzer means when he claims that in some cases, heuristics can be prescriptive. We think that there are at least two dimensions along which heuristics might be thought to have normative significance. An understanding of the way heuristics work and the concrete environments in which they do so might be claimed to be useful in helping to identify normative goals. Alternatively, such an understanding might be thought useful in helping us to design institutions and in other ways help people to realize certain normative goals, once such goals have been identified independently.

Gigerenzer is clearly making the second of these claims, and we see no reason to dispute it. Heuristics are extremely useful because they allow people to reach decisions or to act in short periods of time, which is often necessary to ensure good outcomes. Moreover, they do so in a way that is economical in the sense that they make use of only a fraction of the available information relevant to a given decision. This not only fosters quicker action but sometimes, at least, results in better decisions relative to those outcomes. As one of us argued in another context, more information is not always better; indeed, sometimes it is much worse (Loeb, 1995). Without the gaze and similar heuristics we would be terrible at catching balls.

Moreover, the concept of ecological rationality is an interesting and useful one. For example, Gigerenzer writes, “The gaze heuristic illustrates that ignoring all causal variables and relying on one-reason decision making can be ecologically rational for a class of problems that involve the interception of moving objects” (p. 19). In the case of moral heuristics, ecological rationality means that they “exploit environmental structures, such as social institutions” (p. 8). Gigerenzer seems to mean by this that our
determination of the rationality of a heuristic—and perhaps also whether or not it is morally good or bad—will depend upon the agent’s environment. It is context sensitive and depends upon features external to the agent. Professor Driver, in *Uneasy Virtue* (2001), argued that moral virtue is like this. What makes a trait a moral virtue has nothing to do with the internal psychological states of the agent; rather it has to do with externalities such as what consequences are typically produced by the trait. Indeed, virtuous agents can be unaware of their true reasons for action, the considerations that are actually moving them to perform their good deeds. It may be that morally virtuous persons are those who are sensitive to the reasons that would justify one heuristic over another in a certain situation and so are responsive to the *right* heuristics. Heuristics underlie good actions as well as bad ones, and what makes a heuristic a good one will depend on how it plays out in the real world, what it accomplishes when employed by an individual in a given situation. On her view, good effects make for a good heuristic.

But what about the first of the two claims? Can heuristics help us to *choose* normative goals—in particular, moral ones? Can they help us to identify the fundamental principles of morality (or for irrealists like Loeb, in deciding what to value)? Gigerenzer’s answer seems to be that they cannot do so directly, but they can do so indirectly by placing limitations on what counts as an acceptable moral theory. An acceptable theory must be one that could in fact be used by real people in the real world. Real people aren’t supercomputers, and even if we were, we’d rely on heuristics to solve complex problems. “Simple heuristics,” Gigerenzer tells us, “... are not only faster and cheaper but also more accurate for environments that can be specified precisely” (p. 19).

Accuracy, as Gigerenzer uses the term, is success in accomplishing a particular task, whether it be catching a ball, playing chess, or behaving morally. But this raises an important question for Gigerenzer. Is he suggesting that if morality’s requirements can be reduced to precisely specifiable goals, then sometimes heuristics may help us to achieve them? Or is he making the stronger claim that the requirements of morality *must* themselves involve specifiable goals—the sort for which “ecologically rational” heuristics are most likely to be useful? The stronger claim seems to beg the question against approaches to ethics that do not function this way. To take a central example, deontological approaches focus more on the permissibility and impermissibility of certain behaviors, behaviors whose normative status is not centrally focused on outcomes. Such approaches are, for the most part at least, incompatible with evaluations along the
lines of ecological rationality.\textsuperscript{3} Ironically, there is a sense in which Gigerenzer’s approach fits better with a morality of consequences than it does with a morality of rules.

However, consequentialist moral theories are especially problematic, according to Gigerenzer. It does not appear that his rejection of such theories reflects a belief that they are not well suited to heuristics. We are confident that most consequentialists would applaud the use of heuristics well adapted to achieving good consequences. Instead, Gigerenzer’s criticism seems to rely on independent grounds. One is that “consequentialism . . . can only give guidelines for moral action \textit{if the best action can actually be determined by a mind or machine},” something he thinks “is typically not the case in the real world” (p. 22). He illustrates this with a simple two-player game, which despite its simplicity winds up with so many possible moves that even our most powerful computers would take about 4 times the 14 billion years since the Big Bang to compute it.

But here Gigerenzer overlooks an important distinction philosophers have drawn between the \textit{indeterminable} and the \textit{indeterminate}. Gigerenzer has argued that we are not \textit{able to determine} the answers to the questions posed by consequentialism. What he has not argued is that \textit{there are no determine answers} to such questions. As long as there are facts about what states of affairs are best (and thus about what actions it is right to perform) consequentialism can still serve as a \textit{criterion of rightness}. Consequentialists distinguish between such a criterion and a \textit{decision procedure}. And most would reject the idea that consequentialism sets out a decision procedure of the sort Gigerenzer has in mind.\textsuperscript{4}

However, perhaps this misses the point of Gigerenzer’s objection. Of what use is a moral theory that does not provide us with concrete guidance about how to behave? In the real world, he seems to think, consequentialist theories are impractical in just the way that good heuristics are practical. But this suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of the theory. No consequentialist recommends that we always use a complicated consequentialist decision procedure to decide what to do. Consider the father of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham. After outlining an admittedly complicated consequentialist decision procedure, he then goes on to remark, “It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgement. . . .”\textsuperscript{5}

The reason has to do with efficiency. Bentham and other consequentialists fully recognize that there are computational limits. And overall utility depends in part on the costs of calculating\textsuperscript{16} In most cases, we are better off \textit{not} calculating but instead relying on what consequentialists
have dubbed “rules of thumb”—rules that would function much like Gigerenzer’s heuristics. “Don’t kill another person” is a pretty good one. Of course, there will be situations in which one is permitted to kill—in self-defense, for example. However, by and large, “Don’t kill another person” is a pretty good heuristic.

What is the standard according to which a heuristic is or is not a good one to follow? As suggested earlier, the consequentialist has an answer: Heuristics are good insofar as their employment will lead to good outcomes. The best are those that get us as close as we can to optimal outcomes. It is, of course, an empirical issue what these are. And just as one can use optimality to evaluate someone’s actions, one can use it to evaluate policy, including policy regarding which heuristics to use (or, as in the organ donation case, to exploit). The policies or heuristics that are optimific—as far as we can reasonably tell—are the ones we should choose, given the limits of our computational abilities. However, these may not tell us to maximize the good. Indeed, it would be very surprising if they did, given the costs of calculation, our proneness to unrecognized special pleading and other biases, our lack of information, and the difficulty of the calculations. In some contexts, even random selection will turn out to be the best policy to choose. Although optimality provides us with a criterion of rightness, it need not (and typically should not) serve as a procedure for making decisions.

Of course, even if there are determinate answers to questions about best consequences, a moral theory based on them would hardly be plausible if we stood little chance of even getting close to the right answers. But the situation is not nearly so bleak. Although social chess involves many possible moves, most of them are irrelevant to any given decision, whether about a specific action or about what sorts of policies to adopt. I can be reasonably sure that killing my neighbor’s infant child will not lead to good results, without considering whether the child would have grown up to be as evil, and as well positioned to do evil, as someone like Hitler. Like the so-called “butterfly effect” of urban legend, such possibilities are too remote to worry about in the real world. Of course we will sometimes make mistakes; we are only human. But what makes them mistakes, the consequentialist will argue, is their failure to produce good outcomes. There is little doubt that things would have gone better if Hitler’s mother had strangled him at birth. However, we cannot blame her for failing to know this. And the consequentialist can still argue that the reason it would have been better is that Hitler’s behavior wound up causing such awful consequences in terms of human suffering.
At times, Gigerenzer seems to be endorsing a satisficing strategy. At one point, he claims that a strategy of optimization will destroy trust and loyalty, since, for example, employees would fear being fired whenever an employer thought she could hire someone more productive. Satisficing would not have this destructive effect, he writes, since “... heuristics such as satisficing entail an implicit promise to current employees that as long as their performance and development continue to be satisfactory ... no changes will be made” (p. 25).

The satisficing strategy is deeply problematic. Whatever intuitive plausibility it has rests on its being disguised maximization. Consider the following scenario (which, sadly, no one has actually confronted us with). Suppose that we are presented with the option of taking the money in one of two hands. Which hand is up to us. In one hand there is $10; in the other hand there is $1,000. Which is the rational choice? Most would argue that if—all other things being equal—we took the $10 as opposed to the $1,000, we would be crazy. This is because the $1,000 is the better option. One maximizes one's own prudential good by taking the $1,000, so, prudentially, that's what one ought to do. However, if the hand holding the $10 is right next to us, whereas we need to swim over shark-infested waters to reach the hand holding the $1,000—well, that's a different story, because the cost to us of getting the $1,000 as opposed to the $10 has to be factored in. Of course, we would say under these circumstances that the $10 is “good enough,” but this does not mean that we are rejecting maximization at all. It just means we recognize that money isn’t the only good thing we should be concerned with. Keeping away from sharks is another good. But the point is that both of these are goods because of their contributions to happiness, pleasure, or some other form of utility. Or so the consequentialist would argue.

Gigerenzer also criticizes consequentialism as unworkable because there is so much disagreement over what makes people happiest. Again, this doesn’t count against the theory or against maximization. Consider an analogy with buying stocks. Presumably, the goal of investment is to acquire the most money. There is disagreement about which stocks will produce the most return. Thus, many financial advisors will advise that one “diversify one’s portfolio” so as to minimize risk and increase the chance of favorable return. As a practical matter, this is what one does. This does not mean that one rejects the goal of maximization, merely because one recognizes that one cannot know ahead of time which stock is the most profitable. If one could know that a given stock will be most
profitable, then it would be rational to invest in that stock as opposed to the others. But, in the real world, we just don’t know. Under these conditions of epistemic uncertainty, one wouldn’t pick just one good and run with it. In the moral case, as in the stock case, it is often better to “diversify one’s portfolio.”

Professor Gigerenzer himself says that heuristics can never replace normative theory. And he is always careful to say, for example, that we must study natural environments as well as contrived examples. However, he shows little patience for such examples, at one point referring to “toy problems such as the ‘trolley problems,’” which “eliminate characteristic features of natural environments” (p. 11). But (although trolley problems represent only a tiny fraction of the sorts of cases moral philosophers attend to) there is a reason why philosophers use examples that eliminate some of the complexities of everyday life. The aim is to consider which of a number of possibly morally relevant factors present in everyday situations really are morally relevant, to make judgments about what their relevance is by looking at them in isolation, and to abstract from those features of everyday moral choices that may distract us or tempt us to special pleading.

For example, some people have thought that a fetus becomes a person (a being with a right to life) at the moment when it is born. Any number of changes occur at birth, but is any of them morally relevant? To answer, we must look at these features one at a time. At birth, the child begins to breathe on its own. But don’t people who depend on respirators have a right to life? If so, then being able to breathe on one’s own is not necessary for having such a right. Is it sufficient? Lab rats can breathe on their own, but most of us feel that they do not have a right to life.

In fact, reflection of this sort seems the only way to answer the questions that Gigerenzer admits cannot be answered by heuristics alone. Of course, much more sophisticated examples of moral reasoning can be found in the vast philosophical literature on normative ethics, as a brief perusal of any edition of Philosophy and Public Affairs (or any of a plethora of other excellent sources) will demonstrate. The best such work makes use of the most accurate available scientific understanding of human nature and the environments in which we are likely to find ourselves, and Professor Gigerenzer’s fine work on heuristics has a place in that understanding. Although science cannot take the place of moral thinking, it is certainly of great relevance to such thinking, as long as it is not applied in a hasty and shortsighted way.
Conclusion

We see a great deal of value in Gigerenzer’s discoveries. As philosophers, we have much to learn from psychologists, and we do not, and should not, pretend that we can do without their help. However, the converse is also true. When psychologists try to draw philosophical conclusions from their fascinating discoveries about the mind, they ought to make sure they know their philosophy before doing so, and moral philosophy is more complex and nuanced than Gigerenzer’s treatment suggests.

Notes

1. Interestingly, Gigerenzer allows that “the professional reasoning of judges” is an exception to his claim that, “in many cases, moral judgments and actions are due to intuitive rather than deliberative reasoning” (p. 9). For over a year Professor Loeb clerked for a Justice on the Michigan Supreme Court, who quite openly claimed to follow his “gut” first, developing a rationale for his view only after coming to an intuitive conclusion.

2. Perhaps Gigerenzer’s point is only that, had the coach understood the heuristic, he would not have given the player such bad advice. However, this illustrates that if we are to use the science of heuristics to improve our success, we must attend carefully to questions about the circumstances in which it is wise to attend to them.

3. This may be too quick. In a good society, “Follow the law” or “Follow widely accepted moral standards” might produce good results by deontological standards. However, few, if any, societies have had standards good enough to satisfy most deontologists.

4. Gigerenzer claims that there are at least four interpretations of consequentialism: “a conscious mental process,” “an unconscious mental process,” “an as-if theory of behavior,” and “a normative goal” (p. 21). But although he cites J. J. C. Smart’s claim in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967) that it is important to distinguish between utilitarianism as a normative and a descriptive theory, when philosophers talk about utilitarianism, they almost always have in mind the normative ideal (as did Smart himself in his famous monograph, “An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics,” cited by Gigerenzer).

5. Bentham (1789/1907, chapter IV). Bentham was not alone in this. Mill, Sidgwick, and Moore also held that the decision procedure is not to be followed all of the time.

6. Thus, no serious consequentialist would recommend Kepler’s “methodical search for his second wife” (p. 24), in part because of the bad feelings to which it would give rise. Even if Kepler had been an egoist, he should have realized (as any sensible person
would) that his method was likely to lead to a prudentially bad outcome. CONSEQUENTIALIST views of morality and prudence require taking these bad consequences into account!

7. As in the case of Kepler, an employer who behaved in such a way would be a very poor optimizer, since the consequences of destroyed trust and loyalty are as relevant as any others.

8. The fact that “there are societies where happiness means little in comparison to religious faith and loyalty to one’s national and cultural identity” does not make “the criterion . . . increasingly fuzzy” (p. 24) unless a crude moral relativism is presupposed. According to eudemonistic utilitarianism, faith and loyalty are only valuable insofar as they contribute to utility.
I would like to thank Professors Julia Driver, Don Loeb, and Cass Sunstein for their thoughtful comments. They correctly point out that I have not done justice to the complexity of moral philosophy, and, if I may add, the same can be said with respect to moral psychology. Rather, the question I tried to answer in my essay was this: What picture of morality emerges from the science of heuristics? Sunstein (2005) has written a pioneer article arguing that people often rely on “moral heuristics.” Here we are in agreement with each other, and Driver and Loeb also find it a promising proposition. Note that I prefer to speak of “fast and frugal heuristics” instead of “moral heuristics,” since one interesting feature is that the same heuristic can guide behavior in both moral and other domains.

Do Heuristics Lead to Moral Errors?

Sunstein also points to the imperfect reliability of heuristics. He emphasizes that his comment bears on the debate between those who emphasize cognitive errors (such as Kahneman and Tversky) and those who emphasize the frequent success of heuristics (such as myself). Here I would like to insert a clarification. Some philosophers have contended that the difference between the two programs was that one describes the dark side and the other the bright side of the mind (e.g., Samuels, Stich, & Bishop, 2002), although the distinctions are deeper and more interesting (e.g., Bishop, 2000). Cognitive errors have been measured against logical rationality as opposed to ecological rationality and explained by vague labels such as “availability” as opposed to precise models of heuristics. Let me illustrate these differences with reference to the term “sometimes” in Sunstein’s title. He is right; heuristics sometimes lead us astray, and sometimes they make us smart or good. However, we can do better and work on defining exactly what “sometimes” means. That is the goal of the program of ecological
rationality: to identify the structures of environments in which a given heuristic succeeds and fails. This goal can be achieved only with precise models of heuristics.

For instance, we know that “Imitate the majority” is successful in relatively stable environments but not in quickly changing ones (Boyd & Richerson, 2005), that “tit for tat” succeeds if others also use this heuristic but can fail otherwise, and that heuristics based on one good reason are as accurate as or better than consideration of many reasons when predictability is low and the variability of cue validities high (e.g., Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006; Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002). To the best of my knowledge, no such work has been undertaken in moral psychology and philosophy.

Thus, I agree with Sunstein that heuristics make errors, but I emphasize that there are already some quantitative models that predict the amount of error (e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). Moreover, making errors is not specific to heuristics. All policies, even so-called optimal ones, make them. And there is a more challenging insight. We know today of situations where, in contrast to an “optimizing” strategy, a heuristic makes fewer errors (see below). In the real world, the equation “optimizing = best” and “heuristic = second best” does not always hold.

**Institutions Shape Heuristics**

Driver and Loeb find my suggestion unfair that English magistrates are more involved in trying to protect themselves than to ensure due process. My intention was not to issue a moral verdict against magistrates, who seemed to be unaware of the differences between what they think they do and in fact do, but to illustrate how institutions elicit heuristics. The study of the adaptive toolbox is not about the mind per se but about the mind–environment system. Features of the English legal institution, such as lack of feedback for magistrates’ errors, are part of the system, as is the “passing the buck” heuristic. The distinction between a moral theory that focuses on the individual mind versus one that focuses on the mind–environment system is an important one, which goes beyond magistrates’ bail decisions.

Consider medicine. Is it morally right that physicians make patients undergo tests that they themselves wouldn’t take? I once lectured to a group of 60 physicians, including presidents of physicians’ organizations and health insurance companies. Our discussion turned to breast cancer screening, in which some 75% percent of American women over 50 participate. A gynecologist remarked that after a mammogram, it is she, the
physician, who is reassured: “I fear not recommending a mammogram to a woman who may later come back with breast cancer and ask me ‘Why didn’t you do a mammogram?’ So I recommend that each of my patients be screened. Yet I believe that mammography screening should not be recommended. But I have no choice. I think this medical system is perfidious, and it makes me nervous” (Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 93). Did she herself participate in mammography screening? “No,” she said, “I don’t.” The organizer then asked all 60 physicians the same question (for men: “If you were a woman, would you participate?”). The result was an eye-opener: Not a single female doctor in this group participated in screening, and no male physician said he would do so if he were a woman. Nevertheless, almost all physicians in this group recommended screening to women.

Once again, my intention is not to pronounce a moral judgment on doctors or magistrates. A gynecologist who knows that there is still a debate in medical science as to whether mammography screening has a very small or zero effect on mortality reduction from breast cancer but has proven harms (e.g., biopsies and anxieties after frequent false positives, surgical removal and treatment of cancers that a woman would have never noticed during her lifetime) may or may not decide upon screening. Yet in an environment where doctors feel the need to protect themselves against being sued, they may—consciously or unconsciously—place self-protection first and recommend screening. At present, the United States in particular has created such environments for medical doctors and their patients. For many doctors, it is a no-win situation.

A physician who does not employ this double standard can be severely punished. A young Vermont family doctor and his residency were recently put to trial because the doctor, following national guidelines, explained the pros and cons of prostate-specific antigen (PSA) screening to a patient, after which the patient declined to have the test (and later died of an incurable form of prostate cancer). Note that the benefits of PSA testing are highly controversial, whereas the potential harms (such as impotence and incontinence after radical prostatectomy) in the aftermath of a positive PSA test result are well documented. The prosecution argued that the physician should have simply administered the test without informing the patient, as is established practice in Vermont and most other parts of the United States. A jury found the doctor’s residency liable for $1 million (Merenstein, 2004). After this experience, the family doctor said that he now has no choice but to overtreat patients, even at the risk of doing unnecessary harm, in order to protect himself.
These cases illustrate how institutions can create moral split brains, in which a person is supposed to do one thing, or even believes that he is doing it, but feels forced to do something else.

Maximization

It is interesting how economic theories resemble some moral theories: The common denominator is the ideal of maximization of a form of utility. One motivation for studying heuristics is the fact that maximization or, more generally, optimization is limited. The limits of optimization are no news to the departments of computer science where I have held talks, whereas during talks to economists and other social scientists, my pointing out these limits typically generates defensive rhetoric. In my chapter, I outlined some of these limits in consequentialist theories that rely on maximization. As my commentators correctly noted, these limits do not apply to all forms of consequentialism. For instance, if certain versions of consequentialism maintain that actions should be judged by their outcomes, and that one should choose a good-enough action (rather than the best one), the arguments I made do not apply.

Driver and Loeb defend maximization by introducing the distinction between the indeterminable and the indeterminate. Even if there is no procedure known to mind or machine to determine the best action, as long as a best action exists, consequentialism can still serve as a criterion of rightness. In economics, optimization is similarly defended. I must admit that I fail to understand the logic. Take the example of chess, where maximization is out of reach for mind and machine, but where a best strategy exists. Even if someone were to stumble over the best action by accident, we would not recognize it as such and be able to prove that it is indeed the best. How can maximization serve as a norm for rightness if we can neither determine nor, after the fact, recognize the best action?

Rethinking the Relation between Heuristics and Maximization

The ecological perspective also provides a new look on norms. It is a common belief that heuristics are always second best, except when there are time constraints. Yet that is not always so. Heuristics can also be “better than optimal.” It is important to understand what that phrase means. Driver and Loeb introduce the analogy of buying stocks. Nobody can know which stocks will produce the most returns, they argue; therefore, simple heuristics such as “Diversify one’s portfolio” would be practical. This does
not mean that one should reject maximization, they explain, because if one could know the future, one would pick the best portfolio. Let me outline my view on the matter, which I believe is systematically different.

First, I always use the term “maximization” for a process or, as Driver and Loeb call it, a “decision procedure,” whereas in this passage, it seems to refer to the outcome (knowing the stock results), not to the process of estimating their future performance. In economics, “maximization” refers to the (as-if) process. For instance, the economist Harry Markowitz received a Noble Prize for his theoretical work on portfolios that maximize return and minimize risks. Nevertheless, for his own retirement investments, he relied on a simple heuristic, the $1/N$ rule, which simply allocates equal amounts of money to each option. He explicitly defended his decision to prefer a simple heuristic to his optimal theory (Zweig, 1998). How could he do that? The answer is that maximization (as a process) is not always better than a fast and frugal heuristic. For instance, a recent study compared a dozen “optimal” asset allocation policies (including Markowitz’s) with the $1/N$ rule in 7 allocation problems (DeMiguel, Garlappi, & Uppal, 2006). One problem consisted of allocating one’s money to the 10 portfolios tracking the sectors comprising the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, and another one to 10 American industry portfolios. What was the result? Despite its simplicity, the $1/N$ rule typically made higher gains than the complex policies did.

To understand this result, it is important to know that the complex policies base their estimates on existing data, such as the past performance of industry portfolios. The data fall into two categories, information that is useful for predicting the future and arbitrary information or error that is not. Since the future is unknown, it is impossible to distinguish between these, and the optimization strategies end up including arbitrary information. These strategies do best if they have data over a long time period and for a small number of assets. For instance, with 50 assets to allocate one’s wealth, the complex policies would need a window of 500 years to eventually outperform the $1/N$ rule. The simple rule, in contrast, ignores all previous information, which makes it immune to estimation errors. It bets on the wisdom of diversification by equal allocation. This is not a singular case; there are many cases known where some form of maximization leads to no better or even worse outcomes than heuristics—even when information is free (e.g., Hogarth, in press; Dawes, 1979; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999).

Thus, it is important to distinguish clearly between maximization as a process and maximization as an outcome. Only in some situations does
the first imply the second; in others, maximization does not lead to the best outcome, or even to a good one. One can think of a two-by-two table with the process (optimization vs. heuristic) listed in the rows and the outcome (good or bad) in the columns. None of the table cells are empty; both optimization and heuristics entail good or bad outcomes. The challenging question is one of ecological rationality: When does a procedure succeed and when does it not?

**Description and Prescription**

My analysis of moral behavior concerns how the world is, rather than how it *should* be. As mentioned in my essay, although the study of moral intuitions will never replace the need for individual responsibility, it can help us to understand which environments influence moral behavior and find ways of making changes for the better. In this sense, the fields of moral psychology and moral philosophy are interdependent. A necessary condition of prescribing efficient ways to improve on a present state—on lives saved, due process, or transparency—is an understanding of how the system in question works. Sunstein suggests going further and trying to find heuristics that might be defensible or indefensible on the basis of any view or morality, or the least contentious one. This is a beautiful goal, and if he can find such universal heuristics, I would be truly impressed. Yet Sunstein’s goal is not in the spirit of ecological rationality, where every strategy has its limits and potential, and there is no single best one for all situations. My proposal is to study the combinations of heuristics and institutions that shape our moral behavior. The idea of an adaptive toolbox may prove fruitful for moral psychology, and moral philosophy as well.

**Note**

1. The distinction between process and outcome is also important for understanding the term “as-if model,” which refers to the process, not the outcome. Driver and Loeb suggest that the as-if model refers to a player “who behaves as if he intends to catch the ball” (the decision outcome). The as-if model I describe, however, refers to a player who behaves as if he were calculating the ball’s trajectory (the decision process).