or indexed, whereas most of the objects of everyday life are highly reflective. They bounce the intentionality back at the representation or relay it onto a counterpart, which may in turn relay it, and so on. In this dynamic, the deictic field provides a space of positions and position taking in relation to objects and their values in the embedding social field. To explore the deictic field is therefore to explore a special kind of threshold in the fine structure of communicative practice, a threshold at once individual and social, cognitive and embodied, emergent and durable, language and nonlanguage.

Comments

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Grammatical tradition supplies the linguist with neither the means nor the motivation to account for the way demonstratives are actually used and successfully interpreted in real life. As Hanks's Yucatec examples show, the inadequacy of traditional distance-based treatments of demonstratives becomes clear the moment one looks at actual usage. Hanks's paper is a welcome illustration of the fact that demonstratives operate with respect to distinctions more general than spatial distance (cf. Kees 1979, 1993; Wierzbicka 1980; Himmelmann 1996; Enfield 2003b). Part of the problem he is addressing is the dismal failure of modern linguistics to acknowledge that the system of formal distinctions in morphosyntax has structured relationships with the facts of particular speech situations, relations between interlocutors, and prevailing cultural and social structures. He is showing that these structured relations are describable and belong in a comprehensive description of communicative practice. While the problem of indexical reference is too easily dismissed with a remark such as "Well, that gets worked out from the context," Hanks rightly insists that the language-context relation occupies a single analytic domain. After all, human social action does not observe disciplinary boundaries. For everyday people, the formulation and deployment of morphosyntactically complex indexical expressions and the resolution of their reference are part of a unified process of engaging in physically, emotionally, and socially situated talk. Hanks's model of embedded fields is a significant move toward explicating the structural links between grammar and the physical and social world. It holds promise for a coherent integration of language and context.

Worthy of closer investigation in Hanks's account are psychological factors leading to recognition of relevance. With respect to demonstratives, Clark, Schreuder, and Buttrick (1983) have shown experimentally that resolution of reference is done not by perceptual or cognitive salience alone but by mutual salience for a given set of interlocutors. The contextual monitoring required for successful deployment and interpretation of demonstratives involves a kind of reciprocal awareness. It entails taking one's interlocutors' access to the context into constant account in planning and assessing the specific design of utterances.

Hanks acknowledges the importance of gesture and bodily movement in communicative practice. I view this as part of a growing recognition that linguistic anthropology needs to turn to a careful working out of the specifics of gesture's structural relationship to linguistic utterances and to the social and cultural fields that Hanks builds into them. A key issue is the structural relation between hand gestures and the "linguistic." It is known that gestures are in many ways linguistic (McNeill 1985, Goldin-Meadow 2003). For example, some gestures—"emblems"—are lexical items, conventional in form and meaning and functioning as independent utterances (e.g., the middle-finger sign meaning "F*ck you"). Other gestures—"iconics" and "metaphorics"—occur in tight combination with speech, comprising structurally composite utterances. Pointing gestures are also integrated with spoken utterances, as Hanks notes, but there are many cases in which such gestures occur without speech. Suppose I ask, "Have you seen my keys?" and you simply point to them without speaking. One might want to argue that such a case involves ellipsis, but this would not hold for prelinguistic infants, for whom the independent pointing gesture is a primary communicative tool. One-year-olds use finger pointing to perform a range of communicative acts, including sharing information (Liszkowski 2004, Tomasello 2004). This is not language as we know it, but neither is it pure indexicality or some other "natural meaning." To understand a child's pointing gesture as having a meaning of, say, informing, one needs to recognize the child's intention to communicate and furthermore to "share intentionality" (Tomasello et al. n.d.). When a prelinguistic infant uses a pointing gesture to say the equivalent of "It's there" or "Gimme that," all the elements of Hanks's structure of embedded fields are in place. This may warrant a broadening of what is meant by "language," giving indexicality a more central place than many linguists may want to acknowledge. It certainly supports a more central placement in the structure of language of the kind of model Hanks is developing.

Hanks shows us why linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology are indispensable in an account of communicative practice. His article is a masterful reminder that context can and must be structurally integrated within a theory of meaning.

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In this important paper, Hanks solidifies his position as our preeminent theorist of deixis. Where his previous work on Yucatec spatial reference might have been er-